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Undercompensating for Discrimination: An Empirical Study of General Damages Awards Issued by 
the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario, 2000-2015 
 
Audra Ranalli and Bruce Ryder 
 




The Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (“Tribunal” or “HRTO”) has the power to award damages to 
applicants for violations of the Ontario Human Rights Code (“Code”) for the “injury to dignity, feelings and 
self-respect” they experience as a result of discrimination.1 Significant concerns have been raised in recent 
years that these damages awards, typically referred to by the Tribunal as “general damages”, are generally 
too low to properly reflect the importance of equality rights, and thus do not adequately compensate those 
who have endured the harm of discrimination. Notably, in his thorough and persuasive study of the impact 
of amendments to the Code that came into effect in 2008, Andrew Pinto reported that many stakeholders felt 
that general damages were “routinely too low”.2 Following his review of the Tribunal’s jurisprudence Pinto 
concluded that “there appears to be a widening gap between the Tribunal’s insistence that human rights 
awards should be meaningful, and the actual monetary compensation that is awarded in most instances.”3 
As a result, the Pinto Report recommended that the HRTO reconsider its approach to general damages and 
significantly increase the monetary range of these awards.4  
 
Pinto’s view is widely shared within the Ontario human rights bar. In surveying 50 Ontario human rights 
lawyers in the fall of 2014, Nadia Halum found that 93% of the lawyers who represent applicants agreed 
that general damages awards are too low, 91% of the lawyers who represent both applicants and 
                                                 
 JD, Class of 2016, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University. 
 Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University. 
The authors would like to thank David Baker, Ruth Corbin, Meryl Gary, Yola Grant, Judith Keene, Kathy Laird, 
Andrew Pinto and the anonymous reviewers for the Journal of Law and Equality for their helpful comments on an 
earlier version of this paper. Any errors that remain are the authors’ sole responsibility. 
1 Human Rights Code, RSO 1990, c H.19, s 45.2(1)1 [Code]. 
2 Office of the Ministry of the Attorney General of Ontario, Report of the Ontario Human Rights Review 2012 by 
Andrew Pinto (Ontario: Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General, November 2012) at 70 [“Pinto Report”]. 
3 Ibid at 73. 
4 Ibid. 
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respondents shared this opinion, and even 36% of lawyers who represent respondents believed that general 
damages awards are too low.5 
 
In his report, Pinto did not present data on the size of general damages awards. He did note that, in 
November 2012, $5,000, $10,000 and $15,000 were the typical amounts of low, medium and high awards 
issued by the Tribunal, and that this range of awards appeared to be similar to the range of awards issued 
before the 2008 legislative reforms took effect.6  
 
Against the backdrop of this debate, we present a comprehensive picture of the size of general damages 
awards issued by the Tribunal. What amounts has the Tribunal ordered respondents to pay successful 
applicants as general damages to compensate for the experience of discrimination? How have these amounts 
changed over time? In particular, was Pinto right to observe that the range of awards issued by the Tribunal 
had not changed following the 2008 changes to the Code? And in the years since the release of the Pinto 
Report in November 2012, has the Tribunal responded to his recommendation that it should reconsider its 
approach and significantly increase the size of general damages awards? 
 
To answer these questions, we compiled a database that includes all final decisions of the Tribunal that 
made a finding of discrimination from 2000 to 2015. We tabulated all general damages awards made by the 
Tribunal in these cases during this period (464 awards in total). Our analysis of the data reveals that the 
average size of general damages awards trended upward from 2000 to 2006, then dropped sharply from 
2007 to 2009 (the period of transition to the direct access model of adjudication implemented by the 2008 
Code amendments). Then, from 2010 to 2015, the average size of general damages awards gradually 
increased. 
 
In Part I of this paper, we begin by briefly describing Ontario’s human rights system, and how it has 
changed as a result of the 2008 legislative amendments. In Part II, we summarize the conventional approach 
to general damages assessment consistently followed by the Tribunal throughout the period under study and 
discuss what Pinto and others have had to say about the range of general damages awards issued by the 
Tribunal. Part III describes the method we adopted to compile the data on general damages awards. Part IV 
constitutes the core of the paper. In that Part, we present the data on the mean, median and range of general 
                                                 
5 Nadia Halum, “The Undignified Value of Dignity in Human Rights Adjudication” (Anti-Discrimination Intensive 
Program, Osgoode Hall Law School, December 2014) [unpublished, on file with the authors] at 7-8 [“Halum”]. 
6 Pinto Report, supra note 2 at 72. 
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damages awards from 2000 to 2015. We also adjust the data to take into account the impact of inflation. The 
data reveals that, as Pinto observed, the range of the vast majority of general damages awards has remained 
relatively unchanged across the legislative reforms, and indeed from 2000 to 2015, with his $5,000, $10,000 
and $15,000 low, medium and high benchmarks confirmed as relatively accurate descriptors of this range. 
After adjusting for inflation, our data reveals that the range has, in real terms, decreased. 
 
Our data, and our study of the cases in our database, has led us to share Pinto’s view that HRTO general 
damages awards are too low to reflect the importance of the equality rights protected by the Code. In Part V, 
we consider what steps the Ontario Human Rights Commission, the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario, the 
Human Rights Legal Support Centre and the legislature might take to ensure that the size of general 
damages awards is increased and not steadily eroded due to inflation. 
 
I. Introduction to Ontario’s human rights system 
 
The Ontario Human Rights Code prohibits discrimination based on a list of enumerated grounds, such as 
disability, sex and race, in certain social areas, predominantly employment, housing and services.  
 
For those who have experienced a Code violation, the Code establishes special institutions and procedures 
aimed at providing prompt and affordable access to justice. The Code establishes three institutional bodies, 
or “pillars”:7 the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (“Tribunal”), the Ontario Human Rights Commission 
(“Commission”), and the Human Rights Legal Support Centre (“Centre”).  
 
The Tribunal is an adjudicative body specifically designed to provide accessible adjudication of individuals’ 
human rights applications, by Tribunal members with expertise in interpreting and applying the Code.8 
Individuals who have experienced discrimination file applications directly with the Tribunal at no cost. The 
Tribunal provides applicants with optional mediation services before their applications may proceed to a 
hearing. The Tribunal has expansive remedial powers and broad discretion in determining its own 
procedure.9  The Tribunal also has the power to establish rules of procedure that are “alternatives to 
                                                 
7 The Ontario Code is unique in the country for creating a human rights infrastructure with three pillars. Two recent 
books provide excellent overviews of the state of human rights institutions in Canada: Shelagh Day, Lucie Lamarche 
and Ken Norman eds, 14 Arguments in Favour of Human Rights Institutions (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2014) (14 
Arguments); Pearl Eliadis, Speaking Out on Human Rights: Debating Canada’s Human Rights System 
(Kingston/Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2014). 
8 Code, supra note 1, Part IV. 
9 Ibid, s 40. 
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traditional adjudicative or adversarial procedures”, allowing the Tribunal to assist self-represented 
applicants through “active adjudication”.10 For example, the Tribunal may define or narrow the issues 
required to dispose of an application, limit the evidence and submissions of the parties on such issues, and 
conduct examinations in chief or cross-examinations of a witness.11 
 
The Centre provides free legal assistance to those who have filed, or are considering filing, human rights 
applications with the Tribunal.12 Individuals may receive different levels of legal service provision, from 
summary advice by phone up to representation at a hearing, depending on the nature of their issue and the 
stage of their application.  
 
The Commission is tasked with a range of responsibilities, including the creation of human rights policies, 
undertaking public education initiatives, protecting and promoting human rights through institutional 
partnerships and other activities, and instituting and intervening in Tribunal proceedings in the public 
interest.13 
 
To understand the operation of Ontario’s human rights system over the period of this study and as it 
currently stands, one must be aware of the dramatic impact of amendments to the Code that came into force 
in 2008 and which overhauled Ontario’s human rights system in a number of ways, three of which we will 
discuss here. First, the amendments established a “direct access model”. Before 2008, the Commission had 
responsibility for screening applications and determining which ones it would carry forward to the Tribunal 
                                                 
10 Ibid, s. 43(3)(a). On the trend toward “active adjudication”, see Michelle Flaherty, “Self-represented Litigants, 
Active Adjudication and the Perception of Bias: Issues in Administrative Law” (2015) 38 Dalhousie LJ 119; Lorne 
Sossin and Samantha Green, “Administrative Justice and Innovation: Beyond the Adversarial/Inquisitorial 
Dichotomy” in Sasha Baglay, Laverne Jacobs, eds., The Nature Of Inquisitorial Processes In Administrative Regimes: 
Global Perspectives, Routledge, 2013. 
11 Ibid, s. 43(3)(b)(i), 43(3)(c). 
12 Ibid, Part IV.1. For background and discussion of the adoption of the direct access model in Ontario, see Mary 
Cornish, Fay Faraday and Jo-Anne Pickel, Enforcing Human Rights in Ontario (Aurora, ON: Canada Law Book, 
2009);  Le Tribunal des droits de la personne & Barreau du Québec ed., L’accès direct à un tribunal spécialisé en 
matière de droit à l’égalité: l’urgence d’agir au Québec? / Access to a Specialized Human Rights tribunal: An Urgent 
need to act in Quebec? (Cowansville: Éditions Yvon Blais, 2008) (especially the contributions by Juliet S. Robin, 
“Modernising Ontario’s Human Rights System: The Human Rights Code Amendment Act, 2006”, at 321, Michael 
Gottheil and Kathy Laird, “Direct Access to a Specialized Human Rights Tribunal: The Ontario Experience”, at 145, 
and Pearl Eliadis, “Human Rights Tribunals and Direct Access to Adjudication: A New Generation of Human Rights 
Protection?” at 205); J. Manuel Mendelzon, “Rights, Remedies and Rhetoric: On a Direct Access Model for Human 
Rights Complaints in Ontario”, (2008-09) 6 J.L. & Equality 51; Tiffany Tsun, “Overhauling the Ontario Human 
Rights System: Recent Developments in Case Law and Legislative Reform”, (2009) 67 U. Toronto Fac. L. Rev. 115; 
Michelle Flaherty, “Ontario and the Direct Access Model to Human Rights”, in 14 Arguments, supra note 7, at 169 . 
13 Code, supra note 1, Part III. See Shaheen Azmi, “Ontario Human Rights Commission Promotion Activities: The 
Experience of Responding to Racial Profiling by Police”, in 14 Arguments, supra note 7, at 305. 
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in the public interest. Dissatisfaction with the Commission’s gatekeeper role and chronic delays in the 
processing of applications led the Ontario legislature to adopt a direct access model, hoping to provide 
applicants with more autonomy over their cases and speedier access to remedies.14 As a result of the 2008 
reforms, all applications are now filed directly with the Tribunal and all applicants whose claims fall within 
the Tribunal’s jurisdiction have a right to an oral hearing.15  
 
Second, the 2008 amendments established the Human Rights Legal Support Centre in order to provide 
applicants with legal assistance. After 2008, applicants had responsibility over their own applications but no 
longer benefitted from the legal assistance previously provided by the Commission. The Centre was 
established to meet applicants’ need for legal advice and support. 
 
Third, the amendments strengthened the Tribunal in a number of ways: they ensured its expertise,16 
expanded its control over its procedures,17 abolished appeals from its rulings, put in place a strong privative 
clause aimed at minimizing interference with Tribunal rulings by courts on judicial review,18 and expanded 
its remedial powers.19 
 
At the Tribunal, individuals can seek a wide range of remedies for their human rights violations, all of 
which are remedial in nature, not punitive. Individuals may receive the following remedies to compensate 
for loss caused by discrimination: general damages, which compensate for the “injury to dignity, feelings 
and self-respect” caused by discrimination;20 special damages, which compensate for directly quantifiable 
losses, such as lost wages; and non-monetary remedies, such as a reinstatement following a discriminatory 
termination. The Tribunal may also order a prospective remedy; that is, a remedy not aimed at 
compensating for loss, but rather at promoting future compliance with the Code. 21 These are often referred 
to as public interest remedies. For example, the Tribunal may order that the respondent complete human 
rights training.  
 
                                                 
14 Bill 107, Human Rights Code Amendment Act, 2006, S.O. 2006, c.30. 
15 Code, supra note 1, s.34(1) and s.43(2)1. 
16 Ibid, s.32(3). 
17 Ibid, ss.39-45.1. 
18 Ibid, s.45.8. 
19 Ibid, s.45.2. 
20 Ibid, s.45.2(1)1. 
21 Ibid, s.45.2(1)3. 
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The 2008 legislative amendments altered the Tribunal’s general damages power in the following manner. 
Prior to the 2008 amendments, the Tribunal awarded general damages under two heads. The first was 
pursuant to the Tribunal’s power to award “monetary compensation, for loss arising out of the 
infringement”.22 The Tribunal and the courts interpreted this as including intangible loss.23 Second, the 
Tribunal could award damages for “mental anguish” up to a maximum of $10,000 if “the infringement ha[d] 
been engaged in wilfully or recklessly”.24 The Tribunal routinely evaded the $10,000 cap on damages for 
mental anguish by awarding additional damages for non-pecuniary loss pursuant to the open-ended 
monetary compensation provision, which had no willful or reckless behaviour requirement and was 
uncapped.  
 
The 2008 legislative changes explicitly affirmed the Tribunal’s general damages-granting power, and did 
not subject it to a cap. Section 45.2(1)1 of the Code now empowers the Tribunal to award “monetary 
compensation to the party whose right was infringed for loss arising out of the infringement, including 
compensation for injury to dignity, feelings and self-respect.” In addition, the Tribunal’s “mental anguish” 
award-granting power was removed. Many viewed these changes as a legislative encouragement of 
increased general damages awards, given that the Tribunal’s power to award monetary damages for 
intangible loss was explicitly affirmed and left uncapped. 
 
When the Tribunal finds that the applicant has established a violation of the Code’s prohibitions on 
discrimination, applicants often receive an award of both special damages and general damages where both 
types of loss are established by the evidence. However, the Tribunal did not order an award of special 
damages to successful applicants in 256 of the 464 cases in our database (55%). Moreover, the Tribunal did 
not make a future compliance order or any other non-monetary order in 220 of the cases in our database 
(47%). General damages were the only damages awarded to successful applicants over half of the time, and 
were the only remedy received by successful applicants in a quarter of cases (116 of 464).  
 
We will now turn to a discussion of the approach the Tribunal takes to the assessment of general damages.  
 
 II: The conventional approach to general damages assessment 
 
                                                 
22 Human Rights Code, RSO 1990, c H.19, s 41(1)(b) (past version: in force between 20 Aug 2007 and 29 Jun 2008).  
23 Ontario (Human Rights Commission) v Shelter Corp, 103 ACWS (3d) 324, [2001] OJ No 297 at para 43 (Div Ct). 
24 Code, supra note 23, s. 41(1)(b). For a thorough discussion of how the Tribunal and courts approached these 
remedial powers, see ADGA Group Consultants v. Lane, 2008 CanLII 39605 (Ontario SCJ) (Lane) at paras 130-162. 
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General damages compensate for the injury to dignity, feelings and self-respect caused by discrimination. In 
describing this injury, the Tribunal has noted: 
The harm […] of being discriminatorily denied a service, an employment opportunity, or 
housing is not just the lost service, job or home but the harm of being treated with less 
dignity, as less worthy of concern and respect because of personal characteristics, and the 
consequent psychological effects.25   
 
How does the Tribunal determine the appropriate amount of general damages to compensate individuals for 
this injury? Throughout the time period we studied – 2000 to 2015 – the Tribunal has assessed the 
appropriate general damages award in a particular case by “mak[ing] a general evaluation of the 
circumstances of the Code violation and its effects”.26 The Tribunal conducts this “general evaluation” by 
focusing on two criteria: the objective seriousness of the discriminatory conduct, and the effect of the 
conduct on the applicant.27 The first criterion recognizes that an injury to dignity will be more serious for 
Code-infringing conduct that is objectively more severe. For example, a discriminatory termination will 
generally yield a higher award of general damages award than a single discriminatory comment, because the 
former breach is generally understood to cause a more serious injury to dignity. The second criterion – 
effect on the applicant – recognizes that an injury to dignity may differ between two applicants who 
experience the same objective conduct if their particular circumstances or vulnerability differ. Factors the 
Tribunal will consider in determining the effect of the discrimination on the applicant are: “humiliation; hurt 
feelings; the loss of self-respect, dignity and confidence by the complainant; the experience of 
victimization; the vulnerability of the complainant; and the seriousness of the offensive treatment”.28  
 
After undertaking an assessment of these two criteria, the Tribunal will make an award that is similar to 
awards previously issued in cases with similar facts.29  This is what we call the Tribunal’s “conventional” 
approach to general damages assessment. The Tribunal does this by canvassing the awards made in previous 
cases with similar facts, although this canvassing is not always explicitly discussed in the cases. The 
rationale for applying a conventional approach is connected to the inherent difficulty in measuring injuries 
to dignity and the desirability of some consistency and thus predictability in general damages assessments. 
As the Tribunal explained in Arunachalam v Best Buy Canada:  
                                                 
25 Arunachalam v. Best Buy, 2010 HRTO 1880 at para 45 [Best Buy]. 
26 Ibid at para 45. A similar approach was taken prior to 2008: see Lane, supra note 25 at paras 130-162. For an 
example of how the Tribunal applied the conventional approach to general damages assessment before the 2008 
legislative changes took effect, see Pridham v En-Plas Inc, 2007 HRTO 8 at paras 47-62. 
27 Best Buy, supra note 26 at para 52.  
28 Lane, supra note 25 at para 154. 
29 For a fuller articulation of the Tribunal’s post-2008 approach to general damages assessment, see Best Buy, supra 
note 26 at paras 44-55. 
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Cases with equivalent facts should lead to an equivalent range of compensation, 
recognizing, of course, that each set of circumstances is unique.  Uniform principles must 
be applied to determine which types of cases are more or less serious.  Of course there 
will always be an element of subjective evaluation in translating circumstances to dollars, 
but the Tribunal has a responsibility to the community and parties appearing before it to 
ensure that the range of damages based on given facts is predictable and principled. 30 
 
The conventional approach is based on a review of the nominal value of awards awarded by the Tribunal in 
the past. Since the real value of past awards is diminished over time by the impact of inflation, consistent 
treatment of similar cases over time requires that the nominal value of past awards be adjusted for inflation. 
The Tribunal has noted on a number of occasions that it “should be attentive to the possibility of ongoing 
inflation of [general] damage awards for non-pecuniary losses that was recognized [by the Supreme Court 
of Canada] in the tort context in [Andrews v Grand & Toy Alberta Ltd] … in the 1970s”. 31 Vice-Chair 
Judith Keene emphasized repeatedly in her rulings that the Supreme Court “has taken steps to avoid the 
erosion of the quantum of compensatory awards for intangible loss by ensuring that the original ‘cap’ on 
such awards should be indexed to inflation.”32 As a result of the courts’ taking into account the impact of 
inflation, the cap on non-pecuniary damages in common law tort actions has risen from $100,000, the 
original amount imposed by the Supreme Court in Andrews in 1978,33 to $350,000 in recent decisions.34 
Despite these repeated acknowledgements by the Tribunal that its conventional approach must similarly 
take inflation into account to avoid the erosion of the real value of awards, no Tribunal ruling to date has 
explicitly factored inflation into general damages assessment. 
 
While the dominance of the Tribunal’s non-indexed conventional approach to general damages assessment 
is evident from a review of the case law, the scholarly literature tells us little about the size of general 
damages awards or how they have changed over time. The most useful source is the Pinto Report. As 
mentioned above, in November 2012, as part of the statutorily mandated three-year review of the impact of 
the 2008 legislative reforms to Ontario’s human rights system, Andrew Pinto reviewed Tribunal 
jurisprudence on general damages. He found that, in the time period following the system change on June 
                                                 
30 Best Buy, supra note 26 at para 51. 
31 Ibid at para 49. This passage was quoted by the Tribunal in Lastella v. Oakville Hydro Corporation, 2011 HRTO 
1071 at para 19; Piechocinski v. Toronto Standard Condominium Corporation No 1519, 2011 HRTO 1430 at para 20; 
and Purres v. London Athletic Club (South) Inc, 2012 HRTO 1758 at para 41. 
32 McDonald v. Mid-Huron Roofing, 2009 HRTO 1306 at para 54; Direk v. Coffee Time Donuts, 2009 HRTO 1887 at 
para 90; Dixon v. 930187 Ontario, 2010 HRTO 256 at para 64; Nemati v. Women’s Support Network of York Region, 
2010 HRTO 327 at para 122; Vetricek v. 642518 Canada Inc., 2010 HRTO 757 at para 75; McLean v. DY 4 Systems, 
2010 HRTO 1107 at para 104; MK v. […] Ontario Inc, 2011 HRTO 705 at para 44. 
33 Andrews v Grand & Toy Alberta Ltd, [1978] 2 SCR 229 at 265, 83 DLR (3d) 452 (Andrews). 
34 See, e.g., Sorochan v. Bouchier, 2015 ABCA 212 at para 22.  
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30, 2008 up to November 2012, the Tribunal was “typically” granting awards “in the range of $500 to 
$15,000”. Pinto found that higher awards of $25,000 to $40,000 were awarded “exceptional[ly]… in serious 
cases involving sex discrimination, termination of employment, and/or multiple intersecting grounds of 
discrimination”.35 While there was a widely-held expectation that the range of general damages would 
increase following the 2008 legislative changes, Pinto concluded that the range of damages awarded by the 
Tribunal had not increased as anticipated, and “but for a few exceptional cases, the monetary awards for 
successful applicants [were] not fundamentally different than before Bill 107”.36  
 
As a result of his findings, Pinto agreed with many stakeholders in concluding that general damages awards 
were “routinely too low” to adequately compensate applicants for the injury to dignity caused by 
discrimination.37 As a result, he advocated their increase: “In order for Tribunal awards to be meaningful, I 
recommend that the Tribunal significantly increase the range of damages that are awarded to successful 
applicants”.38 
 
In the years following the release of the Pinto Report, some commentators suggested that general damages 
were increasing. In their 2014 guide to the Ontario Human Rights Code, Knight, McNaught and Hudson 
commented that general damages had in fact increased as a result of the 2008 legislative changes to the 
Tribunal’s general damages-granting power, although their method of determining this was not described.39 
Others suggested that general damages were increasing as a result of the release of the Pinto Report. For 
example, Canadian Lawyer magazine noted: 
Maureen Quinlan, an associate with Hicks Morley, pointed to the 2012 Pinto Report as 
one factor that has led to increased awards to plaintiffs in human rights cases… “We have 
seen that come to fruition,” said Quinlan. “Numbers now range up to the $80,000 range. 
The numbers have steadily increased from case to case. Each case tops the previous one.40 
                                                 
35 Pinto Report, supra note 2 at 72. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid at 73. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Jamie Knight, Melanie McNaught & Deborah J Hudson, Ontario Human Rights Code: Quick Reference, 2014 ed 
(Toronto: Carswell, 2014) at 103 (“[t]he removal of the $10,000 cap applicable to damages for mental anguish under 
the former Code has resulted in increased compensation awards for injury to dignity, feelings and self-respect”) [2014 
Quick Reference]. 
40 Jennifer Brown, “The rise of ‘HR malpractice’ insurance”, Canadian Lawyer InHouse (March 2 2015) online: 
Canadian Lawyer <http://www.canadianlawyermag.com>. We note that Brown’s reference to damage awards in the 
$80,000 range must be in reference to the size of awards in some cases for special and general damages cumulatively. 
See also Ranjan K. Agarwal, “Human Rights Damages on the Rise?”, Bennett Jones Thought Network (20 February 
2014), online: Bennett Jones Thought Network <http://blog.bennettjones.com> (“Andrew Pinto recommended that 
the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario ‘reconsider its current approach to general damages awards in cases where 




In contrast, Dijana Simonovic, former counsel at the Human Rights Legal Support Centre, concluded from 
reviewing all awards issued from May 2012 to May 2014 that awards continued to fall within the range 
described by Pinto.41 
 
The debate around this issue can be approached with more clarity if more is known about the amounts 
successful applicants actually receive in general damages. Thus, we undertook to provide this clarity by 
collecting every award issued by the HRTO from 2000 to 2015, analyzing the resulting data, and describing 
the results in this paper. Greater certainty about the amounts successful applicants receive in general 
damages should provide a better grounding from which debates about the appropriate amount of general 




Using the HRTO database on CanLII, we compiled a list of all decisions issued by the Tribunal in which 
one or more applicants successfully proved that they had experienced some form of discrimination contrary 
to the Code from January 1, 2000 to December 31, 2015.42 From this list, we created a database of all 
general damages awards issued from January 1, 2000 to December 31, 2015. We allocated one entry in the 
database for each applicant. Thus, for cases with multiple applicants each receiving general damages 
awards, we created separate entries for each general damages award received.43  
                                                                                                                                                                               
be listening. On December 4, 2013, the Tribunal awarded a total of $71,000 in general damages and $27,592 in lost 
income to three applicants who it found were subject to racial and religious discrimination.”) The $71,000 in general 
damages was the total amount awarded to three applicants who received awards of $37,000, $22,000 and $12,000, 
respectively in Islam v. Big Inc, 2013 HRTO 2009 at para 302. 
41 Dijana Simonovic, “Update on Human Rights Tribunal Remedies 2012-2013” (Paper delivered at the OBA Annual 
Human Rights Update, 17 June 2013), [unpublished]; Dijana Simonovic, “Update on Human Rights Remedial 
Awards Rendered by Tribunals and the Civil Courts of Ontario in 2013-2014” (Paper delivered at the OBA Annual 
Update on Human Rights, 23 May 2014), [unpublished]. 
42 We are grateful for the assistance provided by the Human Rights Legal Support Centre and the Human Rights 
Tribunal of Ontario in collecting final decisions. We also relied on final decisions compiled by Simonovic in her 
articles cited in note 42, supra, as well as by Dana Achtemichuk in her article “Losing the Public Interest: Remedies 
Issued under Ontario’s Direct Access Model” (Anti-Discrimination Intensive Program, Osgoode Hall Law School, 
April 2014) [unpublished, on file with the authors]. We checked the data drawn from these sources against our own 
review of every HRTO ruling included in the CanLII database from 2000 to 2015. 
43 Notably, cumulatively large awards issued in Islam v Big Inc, 2013 HRTO 2009, and OPT v Presteve Foods, 2015 
HRTO 675, were split into multiple entries. In Islam, $71,000 in general damages was awarded cumulatively; we split 
this into three entries corresponding to the individual general damage amounts awarded to each of the three 
applicants: $12,000 for Mr. Islam, $22,000 for Mr. Hossain, and $37,000 for Mr. Malik. In Presteve Foods, a 
cumulative general damage award of $200,000 was split into two entries corresponding to the amounts awarded to the 




We included entries for all applicants who successfully proved that they experienced discrimination even 
when the applicant did not actually receive a general damages award.  These were included as awards of 
zero dollars. These cases fell into three general categories: 
 
 rulings where discrimination was found against the respondent, but the Tribunal found that the 
evidence did not establish a violation of dignity, feelings or self-respect.44 
 rulings where discrimination was found against the respondent, but the applicant did not request, and 
was not awarded, a remedy of general damages. We included these rulings because they involve 
exercises of the Tribunal’s remedial discretion. The Tribunal has awarded remedies, including 
general damages, even when not requested by applicants.45 One of the reasons for this practice is 
that self-represented applicants in particular may not be aware of the full range of the Tribunal’s 
remedial authority. 
 rulings where discrimination was found against the respondent, but a law was found to be the cause 
of the discrimination. The Tribunal is bound by court precedents that preclude the availability of 
damages for these kinds of cases absent proof of serious government wrongdoing.46 These cases did 
not involve the exercise of discretionary damage assessment by the Tribunal. Nevertheless, they 
were instances of successful applicants receiving no compensation for dignitary harm, a situation 
that the legislature could alter with a Code amendment, and for this reason we included them in the 
database. 
 
Of the 464 general damages awards in our database, 26 were awards of zero dollars. We explore the impact 
of our decision to include these “0” damage awards in our analysis below, at page 19. 
 
For clarity, we note that the following rulings were excluded from the database: 
                                                                                                                                                                               
one case involving several applicants receiving general damage awards, we did not split the awards issued to multiple 
applicants into separate entries. In Gilbert v. 2093132 Ontario, 2011 HRTO 672, a claim involving six applicants 
regarding a single discriminatory comment, general damages of $600 were awarded corresponding to $100 for each 
applicant. This was included as a single entry because the injury to dignity that each applicant experienced stemmed 
from a single comment made by the respondent to all of the applicants as a group.  
44 For example, McLarry v Universal Supply Group, 2011 HRTO 893 at para 52. 
45 See, for example, Vallee v. Fairweather Ltd, 2012 HRTO 325 at para 26. 
46 Mackin v. New Brunswick (Minister of Finance); Rice v New Brunswick, 2002 SCC 13, [2002] 1 SCR 405. In 
Mackin, the Supreme Court held that when governments are found to have breached the Charter through the 
application of a law, damages will be unavailable unless the applicant can show governmental action that is “clearly 
wrong, in bad faith or an abuse of power” (at para 78). In Québec (Commission des droits de la personne et droits de 
la jeunesse) v. Communauté Urbaine de Montréal, 2004 SCC 30, [2004] 1 SCR 489 (Quebec v. CUM), the Court 
applied the Mackin rule to the award of damages against government for breach of human rights statutes resulting 
from a law. The Ontario Divisional Court has said that Mackin and Quebec v. CUM have the effect of precluding the 
award of damages for violations of the Ontario Code resulting from a discriminatory law: Ontario (Attorney General) 
v. Ontario Human Rights Commission, 2007 CanLII 56481 (ON SCDC), 2007 CanLII 56481 (ON 
S.C.D.C.) (Braithwaite). The HRTO is bound by these rulings and thus is precluded from awarding general damages 
against government where the breach of the Code at issue flows from a law: see, e.g., Ball v. Ontario (Community and 




 rulings where no discrimination amounting to a breach of the Code was found; 
 rulings finding that a Code breach occurred, but it did not involve discrimination against the 
applicant;47 
 rulings making awards for breach of settlement (since these awards are not general damages; that is, 
they are not compensation for the dignitary harm of discrimination); 
 rulings on requests for reconsideration (none during this period altered the Tribunal’s original 
general damages awards); 
 consent orders (since they do not involve the exercise of damage assessment discretion by the 
Tribunal); 
 rulings which were overturned on judicial review on the finding of liability or the quantum of 
general damages; in the former case, the HRTO ruling was removed from the database; in the latter 
case, the award substituted by the final court ruling was included. 
 
While some decisions regarding which cases to include in our database involved difficult judgment calls, we 
believe the decisions we made are consistent with our aim to provide a complete and accurate picture of the 
amounts of general damages awarded by the Tribunal to applicants who proved discrimination in violation 





The following figure is a scatter plot of general damages awards received from January 1, 2000 to 
December 31, 2015 by applicants who succeeded in proving discrimination at the HRTO. Each blue square 
represents the amount of an individual award (or awards) received by successful applicants for experiencing 
discrimination. Awards were tracked by year issued, but not by month or day issued, which explains how 
the awards are clustered across time. 
 
 
 Figure 1. General Damages Awards Received from 2000 to 2015 
                                                 






Immediately apparent from Figure 1 is the fact that the range of awards has remained relatively unchanged 
from 2000 to 2015, apart from the $150,000 outlier in the top right corner, which represents the landmark 
award issued in 2015 in Presteve Foods, a case that involved the egregious sexual exploitation of female 
temporary migrant workers.48  
 
Pinto’s conclusion that awards are “typically… in the range of $500 to $15,000” with awards of $25,000 to 
$40,000 only “exceptional[ly]” being awarded in a few cases, appears to be true not only for the 2008-2012 
period he surveyed, but also for awards issued from 2000 to 2015 as a whole.49 While 80% of the general 
damages awards in our database are $15,000 or less (370 of 464), we should add that there are a significant 
number of awards that exceed the typical range described by Pinto: 36 awards of $15,001-$20,000, 23 
awards of$20,001-$25,000, 12 awards of $25,001-$30,000, 9 awards of $30,001-$35,000, 7 awards of 
$35,001-$40,000 and 7 awards over $40,000. The Presteve Foods award of $150,000 to one of the 
                                                 
48 Presteve Foods, supra note 44. 
49 Pinto Report, supra note 2 at 72. 
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applicants in that case thus far stands apart as an outlier rather than an indication of an upward trend in 
general damages at the HRTO.  The award in Presteve Foods was not referenced in any other HRTO rulings 
in 2015, and the only court ruling we are aware of to mention it distinguished it on the grounds that it spoke 
to the appropriate amount of general damages only in cases of “sexual exploitation”.50 
 
Figure 2 below shows, with blue square symbols, all awards except the $150,000 outlier from Presteve 
Foods. We created this graph in order to make the spread of awards more visible. The average award per 
year, in solid black squares, is also included. 
 
Figure 2. General Damages Awards Received from 2000 to 2015, excluding the $150,000 award issued in 





                                                 
50 Strudwick v. Applied Consumer & Clinical Evaluations Inc, 2015 ONSC 3408 at para 28. The award of general 
damages issued by the trial judge in Strudwick was doubled on appeal: Strudwick v Applied Consumer & Clinical Inc, 
2016 ONCA 520. While the Court of Appeal in Strudwick did not mention the awards in Presteve, its ruling is a 
similar example of a willingness to issue increased general damages awards in cases involving severe forms of 




From Figure 2, it is apparent that while the range of awards from 2000 to 2015 has remained relatively 
unchanged, a greater proportion of smaller awards were issued from 2008 to 2015. Changes in the 
proportion of awards are explored in more detail in Table 2, and are discussed later in this paper. 
 
Table 1, below, provides numerical data on the yearly average, median, and range of awards received by 
successful applicants from January 1, 2000 to December 31, 2015. Also shown is the number of applicants 
each year who succeeded in proving that they experienced discrimination.  
 
Table 1. Numerical data on general damages awards from 2000 to 2015 
 
Year Average Median Range51 # of applicants who 
proved discrimination  
2000 10,188 6,500 2,000 – 41,000 8 
2001 9,778 10,000 2,500 – 25,000 9 
2002 14,938 10,000 3,500 – 40,000 8 
2003 14,417 10,000 2,000 – 45,000 12 
2004 16,000 17,000 5,000 – 25,000 4 
2005 15,750 10,000 5,000 – 35,000 8 
2006 22,063 21,500 10,000 – 35,000 8 
2007 15,000 13,000 0/5,000 – 45,000 17 
2008 10,923 10,000 0/1,000 – 30,000 13 
2009 8,837 5,000 200 – 50,000 49 
2010 8,814 8,000 0/100 – 35,000 75 
2011 10,033 9,000 0/600 – 40,000 48 
2012 9,504 10,000 0/1,000 – 40,000 52 
2013 11,264 10,000 0/100 – 37,000 59 
2014 13,198 10,000 0/600 – 45,000 51 
2015 13,279 8,000 0/500 – 150,000 43 
Total 11,216 10,000 0/100 – 150,000 464 
 
                                                 
51 Where the lowest award in a year was 0, the second lowest award above 0 is also shown. 
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We then plotted a graph of the average general damages award issued in each year from 2000 to 2015, 
shown below in Figure 3. 
 




Figure 3 demonstrates how the average annual general damages award changed over time. We discern from 
Figure 3 four distinct periods:  
 
I. an increase in average awards from 2000 to 2006; 
II. a sharp decrease in average awards from 2007 to 2009; 
III. a stagnation of average awards from 2010 to 2012; and 
IV. an increase in average awards from 2013 to 2015. 
 
In the first period, from 2000 to 2006, the average general damages award increased steadily, peaking at 
over $20,000 in 2006, an increase of more than $10,000 from 2000. During this period, and indeed through 
to the end of 2008, as Table 1 reveals, relatively few cases reached the Tribunal for final decision compared 
to the situation beginning in 2009, when applications filed directly with the Tribunal under the new model 
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started to produce a larger number of final decisions. The cases that did reach the Tribunal under the old 
model were carried forward by the Commission, which aimed to allocate its litigation resources to the cases 
that raised the most important issues from the point of view of the public interest.  In all cases that reached 
the Tribunal under the old system, expert Commission counsel appeared to make submissions regarding 
Code violations and remedies, and in some cases applicants also had their own counsel or representative. 
 
The most striking aspect of Figure 3 may be what occurred in the second period: the steep drop in average 
awards from 2007 to 2009, a drop of over $10,000. This period corresponds to the period of transition from 
the old Commission-centred model of adjudication to the direct access model. Bill 107 was enacted in 
December 2006 and the legislative changes it introduced came into effect on June 30, 2008. The Tribunal’s 
approach to general damages assessment did not change substantively from the old to the new regime, and 
the Tribunal and its membership were strengthened by the Code amendments.52 Although it is impossible to 
know for certain what explains the downward trend in general damages awards from 2007-2009, we believe 
the most likely explanation is the significant change in the volume and nature of the cases that reached the 
Tribunal under the new direct access model. As mentioned, under the pre-2008 Commission-based model, 
the Commission decided which cases would come forward to the Tribunal for a final hearing, and it would 
prioritize cases that engaged systemic issues or otherwise had potentially broad impacts on matters of public 
concern.  After June 30, 2008, all applicants – even those whose cases raised relatively minor issues, like a 
single discriminatory comment endured at work – had a right to a hearing before the Tribunal. Under the old 
model, the Commission on occasion did bring forward cases that received general damages awards at the 
low end of the scale: for example, in 2003, 4 of the 12 (or 33%) cases brought to the Tribunal received an 
award less than $5,000. Nevertheless, Figures 1 and 2 above, as well as Table 2 below, make clear that 
under the direct access model a greater proportion of cases received awards within the $0 to $10,000 range.  
 
Table 2. Proportion of awards per period: 2000-2015 
 









Proportion of award type per 
total awards in the period 
% $0 awards53 0% 3% 9% 6% 
                                                 
52 Code, supra note 1, Part IV. 
53 See pages 10-11, supra, for an explanation of which decisions we classified as resulting in awards of $0. 
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% >$0 to $1,000 awards 0% 6% 7% 7% 
% >$1,000 to $5,000 awards 28% 39% 25% 24% 
 % >$5, 000 to $10,000 awards 26% 18% 26% 22% 
% >$10,000 to $20,000 
awards 
 
19% 23% 27% 27% 
  %>$20,000 and over awards 26% 11% 6% 15% 
Total number of awards per period 57 79 175 153 
 
 
In our database for the entire 2000-2015 period, we included information for each award on whether 
applicants’ claims were brought forward by the Commission (which of course was always the case under 
the old regime), and, under the new regime, whether applicants were represented by Centre counsel, private 
counsel or were self-represented. We then calculated the average amount of general damages awarded in 
each situation. The results are summarized below in Table 3. We include them here because they may help 
shed some light on the changes in average awards during the four periods that emerge from a study of 
Figure 3. 
 
Table 3. Average Damage Awards 2000-2015 According to Nature of Representation 
 
Counsel Number of General 
Damages Awards 
Average Amount of General 
Damages Award 
Commission counsel 110 $14,041 
Centre counsel 72 $13,965 
Private counsel or rep 124 $12,508 
Self-represented 148 $7,116 
No counsel indicated 10 $4,980 
Total 464 $11,216 
 
 
We can speculate about potential causes of the variation observed above. First, one might expect that those 
represented by expert Commission counsel under the old model, or represented by expert Centre counsel or 
private counsel under the new model, would tend to receive higher awards than self-represented applicants 
because of the quality of representation provided. However, it is important to note that the Tribunal is 
acutely sensitive to the challenges faced by self-represented litigants who make up a large proportion of 
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applicants under the new system. Indeed, our data reveals that under the new system, self-represented 
litigants have made up 43% of the applicants who have succeeded in demonstrating a finding of 
discrimination before the Tribunal.54  The Tribunal makes extensive efforts to support self-represented 
applicants through ‘active adjudication’, including by considering remedies that applicants have not 
requested in their submissions. These efforts may reduce the impact the quality of advocacy might 
otherwise have on the size of general damages awards.  
 
Another reason for the variation between awards received by those with different forms of representation 
could be the fact that Commission counsel, Centre counsel, and private counsel tend to select clients that 
have experienced more serious Code breaches. The Commission under the pre-2008 model could choose to 
take forward to a hearing only the most significant unsettled cases. Similarly, the Centre in the post-2008 
model allocates its finite resources at least in part by reference to the difficulty and significance of the issues 
raised. Moreover, private counsel will be retained by applicants typically in cases where more is at stake - 
that is, where instances of discrimination with severe or widespread consequences are alleged. A higher 
proportion of cases involving self-represented litigants are therefore likely to involve less serious allegations 
of discrimination. For this reason, in our view the data in Table 3 may support the argument that the post-
2008 situation – where self-represented litigants are free to carry their cases to the Tribunal on their own, 
regardless of the severity of the incident of discrimination – has had a significant impact on the average size 
of general damages awards. In particular, it could explain the sharp drop in the average size of general 
damages awards that accompanied the legislative changes. 
  
To explore whether our decision to include certain awards of zero general damages was contributing to the 
trend in average awards observed above, we removed awards of zero dollars and re-calculated average 
award values. We then went further, removing all awards under $1,000, to explore what impact very low-




                                                 
54 If we remove from the data presented in Table 3 the cases carried by the Commission and the cases where no 
counsel was indicated in the reported case, we are left with 148 damages awards made to self-represented litigants out 
of a total of 344, or 43% of the total. The Pinto Report similarly found “that 44% of applicants who were successful in 
their cases before the Tribunal were self-represented”: supra note 2 at 102. As the Report noted, this number, like 
ours, “provides some corroboration that the Tribunal system is not as impossible to use for self-represented applicants 
as critics claim; and that the Centre’s decision to decline representation does not necessarily impair applicants from 





Figure 4: Average general damages awards received per year -- comparing results obtained from excluding 





Thus, even when removing “awards” of $0 and awards under $1,000, the general trend observed in Figure 3 
remains relatively intact. What appeared to be a stagnation in award values from 2010 to 2012 was due to an 
increase in awards of zero general damages being issued by the Tribunal in this period. 
 
The changes we have found in the average annual value of general damages awards need to be understood 
in the context of the transformation in the scale of the Tribunal’s adjudicative role produced by the 2008 
legislative reforms. Once the Commission’s gatekeeper role was removed, and all applicants could file their 
claims directly with the Tribunal, the volume and range of applications reaching the Tribunal increased 
dramatically. As a result, beginning in 2009, the number of general damages awards issued annually by the 
Tribunal also increased dramatically, as illustrated by Figure 5 below. Over the 2000-2008 period as a 
whole, the Tribunal issued on average of 9.7 general damages awards annually. From 2009-2015, the 













Figure 6 below depicts the dramatic increase in the total dollar value of all general damages awards made by 
the Tribunal each year from 2000 to 2015. We see a major and sustained increase following the coming into 
force of the 2008 amendments, with a high of over $673,000 in 2014. We found that the average annual 
total amount of general damages awards issued by the Tribunal from 2000 to 2008 was $136,167; from 

















Inflation has eroded the real value of awards 
 
We adjusted our data to take into account the effect of inflation so we could depict changes in the real value 
of general damages awards over time. This was done by assigning the year 2000 as the “base year”, and 
multiplying each award by a ratio of the Ontario consumer price index (“CPI”) in the year 2000, over the 
Ontario CPI of the year in which the award was issued.  
 
Figure 7, below, shows an overlay of all inflation-adjusted awards (in red “x” marks) over all non-adjusted 
awards (in blue squares) issued between January 1, 2000 and December 31, 2015. In this way, awards are 
depicted in nominal and real terms. The red “x” marks represent awards in ‘year 2000 dollars’; that is, 
awards that were adjusted for inflation. The blue squares represent award values as issued to the applicant; 












In Figure 8, below, we have removed the $150,000 award from Presteve Foods from this graph to make it 


















Figure 8. General Damages Awards Received from 2000 to 2015, in nominal terms and in “year 2000 


















Figure 9, below, includes two trend lines illustrating changes in the average general damages award, per 
year, in nominal terms (blue squares) and in inflation-adjusted terms (red “x” marks), over time.  
 






Figures 7-9 demonstrate how inflation has caused a reduction in the real value of nominal awards, opening 
up an increasingly large gap between the size of real and nominal awards in the period under study. Since 
the nominal range of general damages awards has remained relatively unchanged from 2000 to 2015,55 
when inflation is taken into account, the real range has decreased. This demonstrates the importance of 
indexing awards to keep pace with inflation’s eroding impact on the real value of general damages awards. 
 
We then removed awards under $1,000, calculated average awards based on this new data set, and adjusted 
the average award data for inflation. The results are shown in Figure 10 below: 
 
                                                 












Table 4.  Data on general damages awards from 2000 to 2015 
 
Year Average award, 














































10,923 9,168 8,394 
0/839 – 
25,181 
2009 8,837 7,391 4,182 167 – 41,821 
2010 8,814 7,195 6,530 0/82 – 28,571
2011 




9,504 7,420 7,808 
0/781 – 
31,232 
2013 11,264 8,709 7,732 0/77 – 28,607
2014 









Awards in cases involving termination of employment based on pregnancy  
 
Because the nature of the issues raised in applications that are the subject of final decisions by the Tribunal 
varies over time - especially with the move from a Commission-centred model to a direct access model in 
2008 - we reviewed our database to determine whether there were any recurring scenarios with similar facts 
that came before the Tribunal over the period of our study. By isolating a recurring and factually similar 
group of cases, we can shed further light on trends in the assessment of general damages by the Tribunal. 
We decided to select cases involving a form of sex discrimination that recurs with distressing frequency: 
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employers terminating female employees shortly after finding out they are pregnant. We isolated all of the 
cases in our database – 27 in total56 – where the applicant established that her employment was terminated 
at least in part on the basis of pregnancy. The scatter chart below depicts the pattern of awards in these cases 




Figure 11. General Damages Awards in Pregnancy/Employment Termination Cases from 2002 to 2015, in 
nominal terms and in “year 2000 dollars” 
 
 
                                                 
56 Chacko v. Transpharm Canada Inc., 2002 CanLII 46514; Dodds v. 2008573 Inc. (Sharks Sports Pub), 2007 HRTO 
17; Maciel v. Fashion Coiffures, 2009 HRTO 1804; Gonneau v. Denninger, 2010 HRTO 425; Guay v 1481979 
Ontario, 2010 HRTO 1563; Osvald v Videocomm Technologies, 2010 HRTO 770; Charbonneau v Atelier Salon & 
Spa, 2010 HRTO 1736; Splane v Ultimate Fitness, 2011 HRTO 195; Bickell v The Country Grill, 2011 HRTO 1333; 
Graham v 3022366 Canada Inc., 2011 HRTO 1470; Chowdury v  2023628 Ontario Inc. o/a Quizno's Sub, 2012 
HRTO 1892; Ong v. Poya Organics & Spa Ltd., 2012 HRTO 2058; Tekyi-Annan v. 2191214 Ontario Inc., 2013 
HRTO 1947; Peart v. Distinct HealthCare Services Inc., 2013 HRTO 305; Korkola v. Maid Day! Maid Day! Inc., 
2013 HRTO 525; McKenna v. Local Heroes Stittsville, 2013 HRTO 1117; Shinozaki v. Hotlomi Spa, 2013 HRTO 
1027; Huang v High Life Heating, Air Conditioning  & Security Inc., 2014 HRTO 1356; Lugonia v Arista Homes, 
2014 HRTO 1531; Golovaneva v Atkinson Schroeter Design Group Inc., 2015 HRTO 1471; Angeles Toledo v 
Mexitaco, 2015 HRTO 1464; Richards v 905950 Ontario Ltd o/a Storybook Childcare Centre, 2015 HRTO 517; 
Lougheed v Little Buddies Preschool Centre, 2015 HRTO 909; Watters v Creative Minds Childrens Services LTO 
Daycare, 2015 HRTO 475; Marne v Aptco Capital Corporation, 2015 HRTO 588; Despres v The Crossbar Inc., 2015 




In the first pregnancy/employment termination case in our database, Chacko (2002), the Tribunal assessed 
general damages at $5,000. The second award, Dodds (2007), was for $15,000. The Graham case, decided 
in 2011, set a new high of $20,000.  
 
Depending on factors such as the length of employment, the presence or absence of discriminatory actions 
in addition to the termination, the conduct of the respondent, any contributing responsibility of the 
applicant, and especially the strength of the evidence of the financial and emotional impact of the 
discriminatory termination on the applicant, the awards issued by the Tribunal range from $2,000 to 
$10,000 on the low end (13 cases), $12,000 to $17,000 in the mid-range (11 cases) and $20,000 at the high 
end (3 cases). While there are only two decisions that pre-dated the coming into force of the direct access 
model, it is notable that most subsequent awards are in line with the range established by those first two 
decisions.  
 
The range of general damages awards in pregnancy/employment termination cases has remained more or 
less constant over the course of the period under study. This is especially apparent when the impact of 
inflation is taken into account. The Tribunal has established a new high end of the range by making awards 
of $20,000 beginning in 2011. However, in real terms an award of $20,000 in 2015 is a modest increase 
over the first award of $15,000 issued in 2007. 
 
V. Discussion and Recommendations 
 
Our data confirms the accuracy of Pinto’s observation that the range of awards during the 2008-2012 period 
remained the same as under the pre-2008 system. Indeed, his observation holds true not only for the time 
period he studied but also for the entire time period we have studied. From 2000 to 2015, 80% of general 
damages awards have been granted in the range up to $15,000 identified as typical by Pinto. Awards of over 
$15,000 to $40,000 accounted for another 19% of awards, and the remaining 3% of awards were $40,000 or 
higher.57 
 
Given that the range of general damages awards has remained roughly the same from 2000 to 2015, it 
follows that, in real terms, inflation has caused this range to decrease over the 15 year period studied. We 
                                                 
57 See Figures 1 and 2, supra, pages 12-13; Table 2, supra, pages 16-17. 
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have illustrated the magnitude of this decrease by adjusting the data for inflation and graphing the results in 
Figures 7 and 8 above.58   
 
In examining the average award over time, we observed that it has gone through several periods 
characterized by upward trends (2000-2006 and 2010-2015), and a sharp decline at the time of transition to 
the direct access system (2007-2009).59 In real terms, the average award dipped steeply below its year 2000 
value in 2009, ultimately recovering to a level roughly equivalent to year 2000 levels in 2014.60 If awards 
under $1,000 are excluded from the data, the average award, in real terms, returned to year 2000 levels in 
2013.61 
 
Is the current level of general damages too low? As discussed above, in November 2012 Pinto thought that 
general damages awards were too low and recommended that they be significantly increased. We agree with 
Pinto’s conclusion and recommendation for the following reasons. 
 
First, failing to correct for inflation has resulted in applicants being awarded less than an individual would 
have received in an earlier year for the same or substantially similar harm. This is a problem, because there 
is no reason that applicants should receive less than others in similar cases simply because they experienced 
discrimination later in time. Failing to correct for inflation ensures results that run directly counter to the 
purpose underlying the conventional approach – the goal of ensuring that similar applicants receive similar 
awards across time. It results in similar applicants receiving less over time.  The courts take into account the 
impact of inflation when assessing non-pecuniary damages in other areas of tort law, as we discuss in more 
detail below. The Tribunal should do the same when assessing general damages for Code violations. 
 
Second, even when correcting for inflation’s devaluing effect, in our view the nominal value of general 
damages awards for discrimination under the Code is too low.  
 
The special and important nature of equality rights must be kept in mind when evaluating the current 
nominal value of general damages awards. In his 1982 opinion in Heerspink, Justice Lamer (as he then was) 
commented that anti-discrimination laws are "fundamental", considered by the people to be, "save their 
                                                 
58 Supra, pages 22-25. 
59 See Figure 9, supra, page 22. 
60 See Figure 3, supra, page 15. 
61 See Figure 10, supra, page 25. 
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constitutional laws, more important than all others." 62  Since then, the Supreme Court has variously 
described anti-discrimination statutes as "public and fundamental law of general application",63 as declaring 
"public policy regarding matters of general concern",64 as being "of a special nature, not quite constitutional 
but certainly more than ordinary",65 as incorporating "certain basic goals of our society",66 as "intended to 
give rise, amongst other things, to individual rights of vital importance",67 and as "often the final refuge of 
the disadvantaged and disenfranchised”.68 In recognition of its importance, the Code, like human rights 
legislation in other Canadian jurisdictions, has what the Supreme Court of Canada has described as a 
“special, quasi-constitutional status.”69 
 
One consequence of the quasi-constitutional status of anti-discrimination statutes that the Supreme Court 
has repeatedly emphasized is that their provisions must be given large, liberal and purposive interpretations 
that best advance the goal of achieving substantive equality. 70  This obligation extends to remedial 
provisions: the remedial powers of human rights tribunals must be interpreted and exercised in a broad and 
flexible manner to ensure the attainment of their goals.71 Therefore, the general damages-granting provision 
of the Human Rights Code should be interpreted liberally. This is particularly important given that the 
general damages power is the only power that can be used to compensate for the injury to dignity caused by 
discrimination. Injury to dignity is not a loss that is ancillary to the range of harms that are caused by 
discrimination – rather, it lies at the core of what makes discrimination harmful. The importance of the 
dignity interest is evident from the Code’s preamble, which discusses human dignity three times in the span 
of two recital clauses.72 We must ask ourselves whether, in 2015, assessing the value of the injury to human 
                                                 
62 BC v. Heerspink, [1982] 2 SCR 145 at 158, 137 DLR (3d) 219. 
63 Winnipeg School Division No I v. Craton, [1985] 2 SCR 150 at 156, 21 DLR (4th) 1 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ontario Human Rights Commission and O’Malley v. Simpsons Sears, [1985] 2 SCR 536 at 547, 23 DLR (4th) 321 
(O’Malley). 
66 Robichaud v. Canada, [1987] 2 SCR 84 at 90, 8 CHRR 4326 (Robichaud) 
67 Canadian National Railway Co v. Canada (Human Rights Commission), [1987] 1 SCR 1114 at 1134, 8 CHRR 
4210 (Action Travail des Femmes). 
68 Zurich Insurance Co v. Ontario, [1992] 2 SCR 321 at 339, 93 DLR (4th) 346. 
69 Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. Bombardier Inc (Bombardier 
Aerospace Training Center), 2015 SCC 39, [2015] 2 SCR 789 at para 30. 
70 See, e.g., McCormick v. Fasken Martineau DuMoulin LLP, 2014 SCC 39, [2014] 2 SCR 108 at para 17; Canada 
(Canadian Human Rights Commission) v. Canada (Attorney General), 2011 SCC 53, [2011] 3 SCR 471 at paras 33 
and 62; British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v. BCGSEU (Meiorin), [1999] 3 SCR 3 at 
para 44; B v. Ontario (Human Rights Commission), [2002] 3 SCR 403, 2002 SCC 66 at para 44; O’Malley, supra note 
66 at 547. 
71 Action Travail des Femmes, supra note 68; Robichaud, supra note 67. 
72 Code, supra note 1, Preamble. We also note that the Supreme Court of Canada, in discussing the section 15 Charter 
prohibition on discrimination, has repeatedly emphasized that the human dignity of every individual is an “essential 
value underlying the section 15 equality guarantee: R v. Kapp, 2008 SCC 41 at para 21, [2008] 2 SCR 483. 
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dignity caused by discrimination at an average of $9,912 (in real terms) truly reflects the importance of 
equality rights legislation.  
 
It is true that the valuation of an appropriate monetary remedy for an injury to dignity is difficult, as the 
injury itself cannot be measured in dollars. As is the case with awards for non-pecuniary loss in other areas 
of tort law, assessing general damages is thus, to some extent, an unavoidably subjective task.73 To help 
meet this challenge, we find it useful to compare general damages awards for human rights violations with 
the size of non-pecuniary damages issued by courts for other tortious wrongs. The special status of the Code 
suggests that general damages awards for its violation should be higher than non-pecuniary damages aimed 
at compensating tortious wrongs that lack a constitutional or quasi-constitutional dimension. Yet, if we 
compare human rights general damages to non-pecuniary damages issued in other tort actions, we find that 
human rights damages are lower. For example, awards for general damages issued for injuries to reputation 
in defamation cases cover a range from $25,000 to $500,000, a range significantly higher than the range of 
general damages issued for Code violations.74 In a recent study of damage awards in defamation cases, 
Hilary Young found that the average general damages award for harm to reputation and pain and suffering 
in cases decided from 2003 to 2013 was $48,799, more than four times higher than the average general 
damages award of $11,216 issued by the HRTO over the 2000-2015 period of our study.75 Reputational 
damages in defamation cases provide a useful comparator, given that Justice Cory famously described 
injury to a plaintiff’s reputation caused by defamation as being “closely related to the innate worthiness and 
dignity of the individual”.76 The same is true of discrimination as recognized by s.15 of the Charter and 
human rights legislation, laws that have superior normative significance in our legal system. In our view, 
the range of general damages awards for the injury to “dignity, feelings and respect” for violations of the 
Code should be at least comparable to awards for injury to dignity resulting from torts lacking constitutional 
status. But if they remain at their current levels, as Pinto noted, they threaten to “send a message that human 
rights and breaches of the Code are of limited importance”. 77 
                                                 
73 See, e.g., Andrews, supra note 34 at 261 (SCR), where Justice Dickson (as he then was) wrote, in the context of 
assessing non-pecuniary damages for negligently caused physical injury: “There is no medium of exchange for happi-
ness. There is no market for expectation of life. The monetary evaluation of non-pecuniary losses is a philosophical 
and policy exercise more than a legal or logical one. The award must be fair and reasonable, fairness being gauged by 
earlier decisions; but the award must also of necessity be arbitrary or conventional. No money can provide true 
restitution.” 
74 Halum, supra note 5 at 14-19; Sagman v. Politi, 2014 ONSC 4183 at para 21; Roger D McConchie & David A 
Potts, Canadian Libel and Slander Actions (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2004) at 865-866. 
75  Hilary Young, “The Canadian Defamation Action: An Empirical Study” (2016) at 33, online at: 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2802787. 
76 Hill v. Church of Scientology of Toronto, [1995] 2 SCR 1130 at para 107, 126 DLR (4th) 129. 




Third, while the focus of general damages awards under human rights legislation is compensatory, not 
punitive, inherent in any award is a deterrent effect. Tort damages awards have the twin goals of providing 
compensation to plaintiffs and deterring future tortious behaviour by defendants and others. The HRTO 
acknowledges the deterrence function of general damages awards when it states, as it frequently does, that 
they should not be so low as to amount to a “licence fee” for discrimination. But we are concerned that the 
costs of complying with the Code may frequently be higher than the amount of general damages awards 
issued by the Tribunal. If general damages remain low, respondents may well decide that violating the Code 
is cheaper than the costs of compliance. 
 
Finally, the Tribunal must consider the impact of low general damages awards on access to justice for 
persons who have experienced discrimination. Applicants are frequently members of vulnerable and 
disadvantaged groups, who urgently need the benefit of the Code’s protections. The Code’s prohibitions are 
aimed at ensuring women can work free from sexual harassment in employment, at protecting racialized 
individuals from being discriminated against in securing housing, in ensuring those with disabilities can 
access the same services that the general public is offered, among other protections. As Denise Réaume has 
noted, “[t]he fact that employment, housing, and services are covered is not just a technical legal fact about 
the scope of the legislation. These areas are covered because of their historical implication in social patterns 
of inequality that have been deep and damaging as well as their ongoing importance in giving people a 
modicum of control over the shape and quality of their lives.”78  
 
The Code is intended to provide individuals with speedy access to remedies for discrimination issued by an 
expert Tribunal at low cost. No fees are charged to applicants under the Code. The Tribunal’s rules do not 
permit the award of legal costs against unsuccessful parties, so as not to deter applicants from seeking 
remedies for discrimination. Nevertheless, the litigation process imposes a host of costs on parties, 
including the time, stress and wages forgone that may result from filing applications, producing documents 
and other evidence, and participating in mediation and in hearings before the Tribunal. Given the increasing 
demand for the Centre’s services,79 many who require representation or other services may not be able to 
access legal assistance free of charge. Applicants who are not represented by the Centre may find it 
                                                 
78 Denise Réaume, “Defending the Human Rights Codes from the Charter”, (2012) 9 JLE 67 at 69. See also Claire 
Mummé, “The Ontario Human Rights Code’s Distributive and Recognitional Functions in the Workplace”, (2015) 18 
CLELJ 145. 
79 Human Rights Legal Support Centre, Annual Report 2014-2015 (Ontario: Human Rights Legal Support Centre, 
2015) at 2. 
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necessary to hire counsel to navigate the litigation process effectively, and thus may incur substantial legal 
costs. For those who need but cannot afford private counsel, low general damages awards impose a barrier 
to accessing justice if the remedy is ultimately too small to justify pursuing a lengthy and stressful ordeal of 
filing and pursuing a human rights application.80  Most troubling, even though the 2008 amendments 
abolished appeals from Tribunal rulings, and sought to insulate the Tribunal from judicial intervention by 
adding a strong privative clause to the Code,81 applicants who are successful at the Tribunal are exposed to 
the possibility of a costs award if the Divisional Court is persuaded that the Tribunal’s ruling was 
unreasonable.  
 
Three examples drawn from the case law during the period under study help illustrate the significance of 
this problem. In Saadi v. Audmax, the applicant was successful at the Tribunal and received a general 
damages award of $15,000.82 Her employer sought judicial review. The Divisional Court overturned the 
Tribunal’s findings of liability and ordered Ms. Saadi to pay $10,000 in legal costs.83 In Pieters, the 
Tribunal’s findings of racial discrimination and awards of $2,000 in general damages to each of the two 
applicants84 were overturned by the Divisional Court.85 While the Court of Appeal restored the Tribunal’s 
findings and general damages awards,86 Mr. Pieters and Mr. Noble were burdened with a $20,000 costs 
award issued by the Divisional Court. This costs award was five times higher than the total of the two 
general damages awards the applicants received from the Tribunal.87 In Nemati v. Ontario College of 
Teachers, the applicant received $10,000 in general damages from the Tribunal after demonstrating 
discrimination on the basis of her place of origin.88 Ms. Nemati sought judicial review in an attempt to 
persuade the Divisional Court that the general damages awarded to her were inadequate. The Court upheld 
the Tribunal’s award and ordered Ms. Nemati to pay the respondent $12,000 in legal costs.89  
 
In light of the fundamental public policy rationale underlying the Code of promoting speedy and affordable 
access to remedies for discrimination, we find it disturbing that costs awards on judicial review can so easily 
                                                 
80 Pinto Report, supra note 2 at 71. 
81 Code, supra note 1, s.45.8 (“a decision of the Tribunal is final and not subject to appeal and shall not be altered or 
set aside in an application for judicial review or in any other proceeding unless the decision is patently 
unreasonable.”). 
82 Saadi v. Audmax, 2009 HRTO 1627. 
83 Audmax Inc. v. Ontario Human Rights Tribunal, 2011 ONSC 315. 
84 Pieters v. Peel Law Association, 2010 HRTO 2411 [Pieters]. 
85 Peel Law Association v. Pieters, 2012 ONSC 1048. 
86 Peel Law Association v. Pieters, 2013 ONCA 396. 
87 Pieters, supra note 86 at para 60. 
88 Nemati v. Ontario College of Teachers, 2010 HRTO 1808. 
89 Nemati v. Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario, 2011 ONSC 5431 at para 11. 
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match or outstrip the general damages awards issued by the Tribunal. Are the harms of discrimination really 
no greater than the costs of hiring a lawyer to defend an award on judicial review? Moreover, persons 
considering filing applications with the Tribunal who receive responsible legal advice must be told that 
while it costs them nothing to initiate an application to the Tribunal, if they are successful, the result could 
be overturned on judicial review in which case they could be forced to bear a portion of the respondent’s 
legal costs. The public policy in favour of ready access to the Tribunal has been undermined by a costs 
regime more suitable to private litigation infiltrating the process at the judicial review stage. The result is a 
deterrent impact on the filing of applications. And for those who choose to file applications, significant 
pressure is placed on them to accept modest settlement offers rather than incur the risks of proceeding to a 
hearing at the Tribunal. 
 
In sum, low general damages awards cause a host of consequences that are detrimental to the achievement 
of substantive equality in Ontario. Low awards relative to other tortious wrongs send a message that 
breaches of the Code are of lesser importance, trivializing the value of these quasi-constitutional, 
fundamental rights.90 Low awards risk creating insufficient incentives for employers, landlords and service 
providers to undertake actions that advance a culture of compliance with the Code. Low awards jeopardize 
access to justice at the Tribunal when they are outstripped by the costs and risks of litigation.91 For these 
reasons, low general damages awards fail to achieve the Code’s purpose of recognizing the inherent dignity 
and worth of all Ontarians. 
 
Increasing General Damages Awards 
 
In theory at least, increases in general damages awards could be encouraged by the three pillars of Ontario’s 
human rights system – the Tribunal, the Centre and the Commission – or by the courts or the legislature. In 





It appears unlikely that the Divisional Court would play a role in initiating change in judicial review of 
general damages awards issued by the Tribunal. The Code gives the Tribunal broad discretion in the 
                                                 
90 Pinto Report, supra note 2 at 70. 
91 Ibid at 71. 
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assessment of general damages for Code violations. The Divisional Court has described the damage 
assessment process as resting “at the heart of the expertise of the Tribunal”.92 As a result, the standard of 
review for Tribunal decisions on general damages awards is at the most deferential end of the spectrum of 
reasonableness review.93 When the Divisional Court has altered general damages awards issued by the 
Tribunal, with the exception of one case 94 it has been to quash or reduce those awards.95  
 
On the other hand, courts awarding general damages themselves, pursuant to s. 46.1 of the Code, appear to 
be taking a modestly more expansive approach to assessing general damages.96 Section 46.1 of the Code 
enables courts to issue general damages awards for violations of the Code if those violations accompany the 
commission of other civil wrongs (like wrongful dismissal) that are the subject of the court proceeding. The 
courts have more latitude in assessing general damages awards under s. 46.1 compared to the deferential 
posture that is appropriate on judicial review of Tribunal rulings.  
 
In the limited case law to date, the courts have taken the Tribunal’s lead in applying the same non-indexed 
conventional approach to the assessment of general damages, but seem to have awarded slightly higher 
general damages awards 97   
                                                 
92 Quereshi v. Toronto (Board of Education) (2006), 268 DLR (4th) 281 at para 64, 2015 OAC 102 (Div Ct). 
93 Lane, supra note 25 at para 160. 
94 Smith v. Ontario (Human Rights Commission), 2005 CanLII 2811 (ON SCDC), increasing the general damages 
award issued by the Tribunal in 2002 CanLII 46512 (from $8,000 to $18,000). 
95 In the period under study, the Divisional Court overturned damages awards issued by the HRTO in six cases: 
Ontario (Attorney General) v. OHRC (Braithwaite), 2007 CanLII 56481 overturning 2006 HRTO 15; Great Blue 
Heron Charity Casino v. Ontario Human Rights Commission, 2008 CanLII 45003 (ON SCDC), overturning 2007 
HRTO 33; Audmax Inc. v. HRTO, 2011 ONSC 315, overturning 2009 HRTO 1627; Toronto Community Housing 
Corp. v. Boyce, 2011 CanLII 38447 (ON SCDC), overturning 2011 HRTO 827; Walton Enterprises v. Lombardi, 
2013 ONSC 4218, overturning 2012 HRTO 1675; and Crêpe It Up! v. Hamilton, 2014 ONSC 6721, overturning 2012 
HRTO 1941. In two cases, the Divisional Court reduced the general damages awards issued by the Tribunal: Papa 
Joe's Pizza v. Ontario Human Rights Commission, 2007 CanLII 23487 (ON SCDC), reducing two awards issued by 
the Tribunal in 2005 HRTO 46 (from $20,000 to $13,000 and $12,000 to $8,000, respectively); Quereshi v. Toronto 
(Board of Education), 2006 CanLII 63704 (ON SCDC), reducing the award issued by the Tribunal in 2003 HRTO 11  
(from $35,000 to $25,000). 
96 We are grateful to Andrew Pinto for his comments on trends in awards issued by courts pursuant to s.46.1, which 
we have drawn on in this discussion. 
97 We are aware of seven civil claims where general damages were assessed or awarded under section 46.1: Leclair v 
Ottawa (Police Services Board), 2012 ONSC 1729 at para 114 (general damages of $2,500 assessed but no finding of 
liability); Wilson v Solis Mexican Foods Inc, 2013 ONSC 5799 at para 92 (general damages of $20,000 awarded for 
wrongful dismissal based in part on disability); Strudwick v Applied Consumer and Clinical Evaluations Inc., 2016 
ONCA 520 (general damages of $40,000 awarded for wrongful dismissal based  in part on disability); Silvera v 
Olympia Jewellery Corporation, 2015 ONSC 3760 at para 153 (general damages of $30,000 awarded for sexual 
assault and sexual/racial harassment); Nason v Thunder Bay Orthopaedic Inc, 2015 ONSC 8097 at para 192 (general 
damages of $10,000 awarded for wrongful dismissal based in part on disability); Partridge v. Botony Dental 




Two recent appeal court rulings encourage a more generous approach to general damages assessment that 
goes beyond the conventional range established by human rights tribunals. In Strudwick v. Applied 
Consumer & Clinical Evaluations Inc.,98 the Ontario Court of Appeal issued an award of $40,000 for 
general damages for violation of the Code, double the amount issued by the trial judge, in a wrongful 
dismissal case involving discrimination on the basis of disability. Justice Epstein reviewed the range of 
compensation awarded by the Tribunal in similar cases, and noted that past awards “should be by no means 
determinative of the ultimate award” and “that there should be no cap on damages arising from the violation 
of an individual’s human rights.”99 In light of the “particular severe” effects of the discrimination against 
Ms. Strudwick, she concluded that “the circumstances here require damages in excess of those awarded in 
[previous HRTO] cases.”100  
 
The Strudwick opinion indicates that tribunals and courts should not be hesitant to issue awards that exceed 
the conventional range where circumstances warrant. The same message emerges from the British Columbia 
Court of Appeal decision in University of British Columbia v. Kelly101 that restored an award of $75,000 in 
general damages issued by the B.C. Human Rights Tribunal. The B.C. Supreme Court had characterized the 
general damage award as “patently unreasonable” because it was “more than double the previous high of 
$35,000 for similar discrimination”.102 In a unanimous ruling, the Court of Appeal disagreed. Just as Justice 
Epstein observed regarding the Ontario Code in Strudwick, Justice Donald in Kelly noted that there is no cap 
on injury to dignity awards under the B.C. Code.103 Moreover, he stated that the Tribunal is not bound by 
the conventional range of awards established in previous cases. “Ranges established by previous cases”, he 
noted, “play a more diminished role in the Tribunal’s determination of an award for injury to dignity.”104 It 
                                                                                                                                                                               
on disability; the Court noted, at para 19, that  “[w]hile on the high end, this award is clearly within the range 
supported by the case law and by the trial judge’s findings of the appellant’s wilful misconduct…”); and Williams v 
Vogel of Canada, 2016 ONSC 342 at paras 105-106 (general damages of $5,000 were awarded for breach of the Code 
to the plaintiff’s estate, for wrongful dismissal based on disability). The courts have been guided by the range of 
awards issued by the HRTO in similar cases. In other words, when assessing general damages for Code breaches 
pursuant to s.46.1, the early indications are that judges will follow the same non-indexed conventional approach as the 
Tribunal. 
98 2016 ONCA 520. 
99 Ibid at para 72. 
100 Ibid at paras 65 and 74. 
101 2016 BCCA 271. 
102 2015 BCSC 1731 at para 176. 




is not unreasonable, he held, for a Tribunal to exceed the conventional range.105 It is for the Tribunal, he 
said, to measure appropriate compensation based on all of the evidence, not the reviewing judge.106  
 
The Ontario Legislature 
 
In our view it would be inadvisable for the legislature to consider amendments to the Code that would alter 
the broad remedial discretion currently granted to the Tribunal. The discretion to tailor appropriate remedies 
should remain with the Tribunal as the specialized body with the requisite expertise to administer Ontario’s 
human rights system with sensitivity to the specific facts of each case as well as the broader patterns of 
disadvantage that produce discrimination.  
 
Nevertheless, we would suggest four amendments to the Code that we believe are worth considering and 
that would not interfere with the Tribunal’s remedial discretion. One would be to amend the Code to 
provide that general damages can be awarded against the government when discrimination flows from a 
statute, regulation or a by-law. The Tribunal is currently bound by court decisions that preclude general 
damages awards in these circumstances absent government action that is “clearly wrong, in bad faith or an 
abuse of power.”107 This rule, originally adopted in the context of Charter claims, is intended to relieve 
legislative bodies from concerns about incurring tortious liability when exercising law-making 
responsibilities. While this is an important consideration, it should not lead in our view to a rule that in 
practice amounts to a blanket immunity. A better approach would be to amend the Code to permit the 
Tribunal to exercise its discretion to award general damages against governments for discrimination caused 
by laws, and directing the Tribunal to consider the burden on law-making bodies when doing so. In this 
way, the goal of compensating individuals for injury to “dignity, feelings and self-respect” could be 
appropriately balanced against the need to not unduly burden law-making bodies. 
 
Second, the legislature should consider an amendment to restrict the award of costs by the courts when 
respondents found liable in Tribunal decisions are successful on judicial review. Such an amendment would 
remove a significant form of financial jeopardy that applicants to the Tribunal currently face. It might also 
lead respondents to pause before initiating judicial review applications, a consequence that would be 
consistent with the legislature’s adoption of a strong privative clause stating that Tribunal decisions are 
                                                 
105 Ibid at para 61. 
106 Ibid at para 62. 
107 See Mackin, Quebec v. CUM and Braithwaite, supra note 47. 
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“final and not subject to appeal and shall not be altered or set aside in an application for judicial review or in 
any other proceeding unless the decision is patently unreasonable.”108 
 
Third, the legislature should consider restoring the Tribunal’s power to award damages, in addition to 
general damages, where the respondent has willfully or recklessly violated the Code. While the legislature 
apparently intended to increase damages awards when Bill 107 repealed the provision of the Code that 
allowed the Tribunal to make awards in these circumstances of up to $10,000 for “mental anguish”, the 
result appears to have been the opposite. Moreover, recent awards issued by the Canadian Human Rights 
Tribunal, which can consist of two prongs pursuant to s.53 of the Canadian Human Rights Act – one as 
compensation for “pain and suffering”, and another as “special compensation” for wilful or reckless 
violations109 – have tended to be greater in combination than the single awards for general damages issued 
by the HRTO.110 The two-pronged approach may encourage the Tribunal to focus not just on compensation, 
but also in a more sustained way on the need to fashion awards with sufficient deterrent impact (especially 
for reckless or repeat violators of the Code) to create a culture of human rights compliance. 
 
The Human Rights Legal Support Centre 
 
Counsel from the Centre assisting individuals with applications before the Tribunal (and private counsel for 
applicants) could adopt a range of different practices aimed at increasing general damages awards. First, 
counsel making submissions before the Tribunal could advocate directly for the Tribunal to adopt 
indexation practices. It may be useful for the Centre to adopt an institutional policy or practice of promoting 
indexing, such as a policy of consistently referring to not only the nominal value of general damages awards 
                                                 
108 Code, supra note 1, s.45.8. 
109 Sections 53(2)(e) of the Canadian Human Rights Act (CHRA), RSC 1985, c. H-6, empowers the Canadian Human 
Rights Tribunal (CHRT) to issue an award to compensate the applicant “for any pain and suffering” resulting from a 
discriminatory practice, up to a maximum of $20,000. In addition, the CHRT may order “special compensation” of up 
to $20,000 if the respondent engaged in a discriminatory practice “wilfully or recklessly”: ibid, s.53(3). The two-
pronged federal counterpart to HRTO general damages awards is thus capped at a combined amount of $40,000. The 
caps are unfortunate. In our view, legislation that stipulates minimum or maximum awards for human rights violations 
is an undesirable interference with human rights tribunals’ remedial discretion. 
110 For example, in the CHRT’s three rulings that made findings of discrimination issued in 2015, the Tribunal issued 
the following equivalents of what in Ontario we would call general damages awards: $30,000 in Turner v. Canada 
Border Services Agency, 2015 CHRT 10 ($15,000 for pain and suffering and $15,000 as special compensation), the 
finding of discrimination was overturned by the Federal Court in Canada (Attorney General) v Turner, 2015 FC 
1209, affirmed Canada (Attorney General) v Turner, 2017 FCA 2; $20,000 in First Nations Child & Family Caring 
Society of Canada v. Attorney General of Canada, 2015 CHRT 14 ($10,000 for pain and suffering and $10,000 as 
special compensation); and $40,000 in Tanner v. Gambler First Nation, 2015 CHRT 19 ($15,000 for pain and 
suffering and $25,000 as special compensation for two discriminatory incidents). 
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granted in previous cases, but also the indexed value when making submissions during settlement 
negotiations, mediation, or adjudication. 
 
Second, and separate from the issue of inflation, counsel may want to consider some of the practices 
recently exhibited by lawyers in labour arbitration cases. As Lisa Feinberg has described, 111  labour 
arbitrators are increasingly awarding higher general damages amounts for Human Rights Code breaches,112 
and these awards are being granted in cases where counsel are adopting practices rarely seen at the 
Tribunal.113 Feinberg identified three notable practices that may have played a role in persuading arbitrators 
to award higher amounts. First, union counsel are referring directly to the Pinto Report’s recommendation 
on general damages.114 Second, union counsel are requesting awards in the six-figure plus range. In three 
notable labour cases reviewed by Feinberg, counsel requested amounts ranging from $75,000 to over $3.5 
million.115 In these cases, the arbitrators granted awards ranging from $25,000 to $98,000 – amounts which, 
while still being significantly lower than the amounts requested, are notable for being generally higher than 
awards typically seen at the Tribunal.116 Finally, rather than requesting a single lump sum award for the 
respondent’s breach of the Code, union counsel are breaking down their request for general damages into 
separate amounts for each Code breach found.117 For example, in Hamilton (City) v Amalgamated Transit 
Union, Local 107, a case alleging sexual harassment of a transit inspector by her supervisor in the Hamilton 
public transit service, union counsel broke down the request for general damages into separate awards for 
each instance of a Code violation: $10,000 for unwanted touching, $10,000 for the receipt of pornographic 
emails, $15,000 for public humiliation as a result of the offensive comments and gestures made, $20,000 for 
the City’s failure to investigate, and $20,000 for reprisal.118 In this case, the arbitrator noted that the 
Tribunal does not generally award separate general damages amounts for each Code breach in one 
application, but awarded a total general damages award of $25,000, “bearing in mind the ATU’s distinct 
                                                 
111 Lisa Feinberg, “General Damage Awards since the Pinto Report: What human rights litigators can learn from 
labour arbitration cases”, Paper delivered at the OBA Annual Update on Human Rights, 23 May 2014), [unpublished] 
at 10-14 [“Feinberg”]. 
112  See, for example, Ontario Public Service Employees Union v Ontario (Ministry of Safety and Correctional 
Services, [2013] OGSBA No 116 [Ranger Grievance] ($98,000 in general damages awarded); Hamilton (City) v 
Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 107, [2013] OLAA No 371[AB Grievance] ($25,000 in general damages 
awarded); Ontario Public Service Employees Union v Ontario (Community Safety and Correctional Services, [2014] 
OGSBA No 1 [Hyland] ($30,000 in general damages awarded). 
113 Feinberg, supra note 112 at 14. In a similar vein, some CHRT rulings have made separate damages awards for 
separate discriminatory incidents: see, e.g, Tanner, supra note 111. 
114 Feinberg, supra note 112 at 14.  
115 Ibid at 10-14. 
116 Ibid at 14-15. 
117 Ibid at 15. 
118 Ibid at 12; AB Grievance, supra note 113 at para 160. 
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claims for specific violations on AB’s behalf.”119 While the Tribunal typically awards a single general 
damages award even in cases involving multiple discriminatory incidents, issuing separate awards for each 
incident would fall within the Tribunal’s broad remedial discretion pursuant to s.45.2 of the Code. 
 
In addition, counsel may wish to consider citing case law from other areas of law, such as non-pecuniary 
damages issued in tort law. Non-pecuniary tort damages awards made by the courts are for pain and 
suffering, lost enjoyment of life and lost expectation of life caused by the tort (or for harm to reputation and 
pain and suffering in the defamation context), concepts that are not equivalent to the injury caused by 
discrimination to “dignity, feelings and self-respect”. But where there is overlap or a close affinity between 
discriminatory wrongs and common law wrongs, non-pecuniary damages awards should provide useful 
reference points for the Tribunal. For example, non-pecuniary damages awards made by courts in sexual 
harassment tort cases may provide useful comparators for the Tribunal in fashioning general damages 
remedies for claims involving sexual harassment.  
  
The Ontario Human Rights Commission 
 
The Ontario Human Rights Commission could assist in increasing general damages awards in several ways. 
First, the Commission could advocate for the indexation of awards in its submissions to the Tribunal, either 
while acting as an intervenor in s. 34 applications or when it is bringing an application in the public interest 
pursuant to s. 35 of the Code.  Second, the Commission could conduct research into the state of general 
damages awards in Ontario and other jurisdictions as part of its “duty to protect the public interest” and “to 
promote the elimination of discriminatory practices.120 Drawing on this research, and as part of its mandate 
to engage in public legal education121 and to promote and advance respect for human rights in Ontario,122 
the Commission could advocate for indexation or other strategies aimed at ensuring general damages 
awards issued by the Tribunal are adequate. 
 
The Commission could also consider developing and approving a policy on general damages assessment, or 
on the Tribunal’s remedial practices more generally, pursuant to its authority to craft and approve policies 
“to provide guidance on the application of Parts I and II” of the Code.123 The Code provides that the 
                                                 
119 Ibid at para 171. 
120 Code, supra note 1 at s 29.  
121 Ibid, s 29(b). 
122 Ibid, s 29. 
123 Ibid, s 30. 
42 
 
Tribunal is bound to consider Commission policies if parties or interveners raise them during proceedings at 
the Tribunal.124 If the Commission was a party or an intervenor in an application at the Tribunal and the 
Commission believes that the Tribunal made a decision or order that was inconsistent with a Commission 
policy, the Commission can require the Tribunal to “state a case” to the Divisional Court relating to that 
decision.125  
 
However, we have doubts about whether the Commission has the authority to develop and approve a policy 
on general damages assessment. Section 30 of the Code provides that the Commission can develop and 
approve policies relating to Parts I and II of the Code, the Parts that set out prohibitions on discrimination 
and address their interpretation and application. 126  However, the Tribunal’s power to award general 
damages is located elsewhere in the Code. Part IV establishes the Tribunal and gives it broad powers to 
determine its procedures and practices, including remedial practices, for the resolution of applications. 127  
In other words, while the Code recognizes that the Commission has expertise in interpreting the scope and 
applicability of the Code’s prohibitions on discrimination, it has designated the Tribunal, not the 
Commission, as the expert in determining what procedures and practices will best ensure a “fair, just and 
expeditious” resolution of applications.128 Thus, it is likely that if the Commission were to craft a policy on 
general damages assessment, it would be exceeding the scope of its authority and encroaching on the 
authority of the Tribunal.  
 
The Ontario Human Rights Tribunal 
 
As noted above, the Tribunal has frequently acknowledged in principle the importance of taking inflation 
into account when assessing general damages.129 However, the Tribunal has never explicitly taken inflation 
into account in the assessment of general damages in a particular case. In our view, the Tribunal needs to 
adopt a consistent practice of indexing general damages awards to account for inflation’s devaluing effect 
on the nominal size of awards over time. 
 
Persuasive precedent exists in other areas of the law for adopting such a practice. In 1978 the Supreme 
Court of Canada imposed a $100,000 cap on non-pecuniary damage awards in common law personal injury 
                                                 
124 Ibid, s 45.5(2). 
125 Ibid, s 45.6(1). 
126 Ibid, s.30. 
127 Ibid, sections 40, 41, 43 (broad rule making power) and 45.2 (broad remedial discretion) 
128 Ibid, sections 40 and 41. 
129 Best Buy, supra note 26 at para 49, and the other cases cited in notes 32-33, supra. 
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actions and noted that these awards should be “viewed flexibly in recognition of… changing economic 
conditions”.130 Four years later, the Court affirmed that the cap should be indexed to account for inflation.131 
Courts now routinely adjust the $100,000 cap on non-pecuniary damages in personal injury actions. For 
example, in Knight v. Knight, counsel agreed that the cap had risen to $350,000 by 2014 when adjusted for 
inflation.132 
 
Courts have also adopted indexation mechanisms for statutory non-pecuniary awards. For example, courts 
have indexed awards issued under s. 61(2)(e) of the Ontario Family Law Act for the loss of “guidance, care 
and companionship” when a family member is negligently injured or killed.133 The Ontario Court of Appeal 
has described these relational losses as “immeasurable” and “incalculable”.134 In Fiddler v Chiavetti, the 
Court adjusted the range of s.61(1)(e)  damages as follows: 
In February 1992, (the month of the To accident) the consumer price index for Canada 
was at 83.3.  In January 2005, the month of the deceased’s death, the consumer price 
index was at 105.3.  Given that increase in the consumer price index, therefore, the 
damages in January 2005 equivalent to $100,000 in February 1992 are roughly $125,000. 
That is, it would take approximately $125,000 in January 2005 dollars to purchase the 
same basket of goods purchased for $100,000 in 1992.  I therefore find that the upper end 
of the acceptable range of damages in this case would be limited to approximately 
$125,000.135 
 
What approach could the Tribunal take to indexing general damages awards to account for inflation? We 
suggest that the Tribunal adopt a rule pursuant to s. 43(1) of the Code, which grants the Tribunal the power 
to “make rules governing practice or procedure before it”.136 The rule could stipulate that when the Tribunal 
considers the size of general damages awards in previous rulings interpreting the Code, or when parties 
make submissions on the size of general damages awards in previous rulings, the amount will be described 
by referring to both the nominal size of the award at the time of the ruling and the current size of the award 
after having accounted for inflation. 
 
The Tribunal could consider adopting a practice direction to counsel directing them to use a certain specific 
inflation calculator – for example, the Tribunal could create one which could be accessible through the 
                                                 
130 Andrews, supra note 34 at 263. 
131 Lindal v Lindal, [1981] 2 SCR 629, 129 DLR (3d) 263 at 640-641. 
132 Knight (Litigation guardian of) v Knight, 2014 BCSC 1478, [2014] BCJ No 2034 at para 82. See also Sorochan, 
supra note 35. 
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Tribunal’s website, or it could refer counsel to the Bank of Canada’s online inflation calculator.137 However, 
the Bank of Canada’s calculator uses the national consumer price index, and the Tribunal may prefer to craft 
their own using the Ontario index as we have done in our calculations, as that approach would more 
accurately ensure that Ontario residents are receiving the same value of awards as Ontario residents have in 
previous years. 
 
Implementation of the above-described practice could occur in the following manner. Take as an example 
the following paragraph from Richards,138 one of many we could have selected that typifies the Tribunal’s 
non-indexed conventional approach to general damages assessment. We have altered it in a manner that 
would reflect how it might look if the Tribunal adopted the rule we have just proposed, with our alterations 
highlighted in bold text: 
 
The applicant requests that the Tribunal award her $15,000 dollars in general damages. In 
reviewing decisions of the Tribunal where pregnancy was either a factor or the sole reason 
to terminate employment, I note that to date, awards for injury to dignity, feelings and 
self-respect have generally ranged between $10,000.00 and $20,000.00. See for example: 
Bickell v. The Country Grill, 2011 HRTO 1333 (CanLII)($15,000.00N; $15,874R), 
Graham v 3022366 Canada Ltd., 2011 HRTO 1470 (CanLII) ($20,000.00N; $21,165R), 
Maciel v. Fashion Coiffures, 2009 HRTO 1804 (CanLII) ($15,000.00N; $16,618R)... 
Purres v. London Athletic Club (South) Inc., 2012 HRTO 1758 (CanLII) ($10,000.00N; 
$10,435R).139 
 
The Tribunal issued a general damages award of $10,000 in Richards.140 In light of the above adjustments, 
the Tribunal chose an award that had a real value below the low end of the range of cases it cited. To fulfill 
the Tribunal’s desire for consistent awards in similar cases in real terms, a more appropriate award would 
have been $10,435. 
 
We believe the case for indexing general damages awards is unimpeachable. It better fulfills the Tribunal’s 
desire for consistency that drives its adherence to a conventional approach. But in our view, indexing is not 
enough. Indexing simply prevents the low value of general damages awards from sinking even lower 
through the eroding effects of inflation. If one accepts that the range of general damages awards needs to be 
significantly increased, as the Pinto Report and we have argued, the Tribunal needs to be willing to step 
beyond the conventional range of awards. The unprecedented $150,000 general damages award issued by 
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Vice-Chair Mark Hart in Presteve Foods141 provides an encouraging example. In a careful and thoroughly 
reasoned opinion, he explained why the circumstances of that case required such an unusually large award. 
Tribunal members should be able to present similarly careful reasoning to justify awards that go beyond the 
conventional range in other cases, including cases that involve common scenarios, like terminations of 
employment based in part on the applicant’s disability or pregnancy.  
 
It is true of course that increasing the range of general damages awards will initially come at some cost to 
the virtues of consistency and predictability that have driven the Tribunal’s adherence to a conventional 
approach.  But while consistency and predictability are important values, allowing them to have a 
determining impact on damage assessment will have the effect of preventing Pinto’s recommendation from 
ever being implemented. One might also argue that Tribunal members who are bold enough to issue awards 
beyond the conventional range will be doing applicants no favours, as those awards will be vulnerable to 
being altered on judicial review. This is indeed a real risk in light of the one-sided direction of the 
Divisional Court’s interventions with Tribunal general damages awards on judicial review.142 But this risk 
can be minimized if Tribunal members carefully and persuasively make the case for departing from the 
conventional range. Damage assessment, as the courts have repeatedly emphasized, lies at the heart of the 
Tribunal’s expertise. As the Ontario Court of Appeal recognized in Strudwick,143 and the B.C. Court of 
Appeal recognized in Kelly,144 it cannot be the case that the only reasonable exercise of the Tribunal’s 





Our analysis of general damages awards issued by the HRTO has revealed that, consistent with the findings 
of the Pinto Report, the range of general damages awards has remained more or less constant in nominal 
terms over the entire 2000-2015 period. We have also found that, in real terms, the range of general 
damages awards has decreased.  Compared to the size of non-pecuniary damages awards made by the courts 
in other areas of tort law, such as defamation, HRTO general damages awards have been modest in size 
throughout the period under study, notwithstanding the quasi-constitutional status of the rights protected by 
the Code. We have argued that the Pinto Report was right to urge the Tribunal to reconsider its approach to 
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general damages and significantly increase the monetary range of these awards. While the average size of 
general damages awards has followed an upward trend from 2010 onwards, the increase has been modest, 
especially in real terms. The Tribunal has not altered its non-indexed conventional approach to general 
damages assessment, and until it does, the significant change recommended by Pinto will not be realized. 
The non-indexed conventional approach will continue to produce a stable pattern of nominal awards whose 
real value is steadily eroded by the Tribunal’s failure to account for the impact of inflation. 
 
We have suggested a number of steps that could be taken by the Tribunal to redress the situation. An easily 
adopted reform, consistent with precedent in other areas of tort law, would be for the Tribunal to 
systematically adjust the size of past awards for inflation to ensure that its conventional approach to general 
damages assessment does not lead to the steady erosion of the real value of awards.  
 
Indexation is a necessary but insufficient step. We have argued that the Tribunal needs to move beyond its 
conventional approach to the assessment of general damages in order to accomplish meaningful 
compensation and deterrence. Awards should reflect the quasi-constitutional status of the rights protected by 
the Code. They should also be sufficient to ensure that litigants receive compensation that surpasses the 
costs and risks associated with the Code application process, including the danger of costs being awarded 
against applicants on judicial review. To ensure meaningful deterrence of human rights violations, the 
Tribunal often makes the point in its rulings that it must avoid issuing awards that are so modest as to 
amount to nothing more than a “licence fee” for discrimination. Yet our data reveals that 181 of the 464 
general damages awards issued by the Tribunal from 2000 to 2015 (or 39%) were for amounts of $5,000 or 
less. In our view, the Tribunal’s actual general damages assessments do not conform to its own guiding 
principles. 
 
While our study has focused on HRTO general damages assessments, and has led us to critical conclusions, 
our focus should not detract from the signal accomplishments of the Tribunal since the direct access model 
came into force in 2008. As Andrew Pinto noted in his report, under the new system “a greater volume of 
cases are resolved faster without a backlog developing and, for those cases that do not settle and proceed to 
a hearing, they are decided much faster.”145 Our data reveals that after 2008, the Tribunal is issuing general 
damages awards at a rate six times higher than it did prior to the reforms, and the total amount of general 
damages issued annually by the Tribunal is on average four times greater than was the case under the old 
system. The significant drop in the average value of general damages awards after the 2008 changes is to a 
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large extent explained by the much higher volume of cases reaching the Tribunal, cases that raise a broader 
range of discrimination issues, from relatively minor “single incident” infringements of the Code to more 
serious systemic issues. 
 
Moreover, we have no reason to believe that other Canadian human rights tribunals have a better record 
than the HRTO when it comes to awarding non-pecuniary damages as compensation for the experience of 
discrimination. The woefully thin body of case law issuing damages for breaches of Charter rights and 
freedoms hardly provides inspiration to statutory tribunals.146 While we have not undertaken a systematic 
study of general damages awards issued by other Canadian human rights tribunals, we do note that in the 
past year both the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal and the B.C. Human Rights Tribunal have issued 
awards that on average are higher than the norm in Ontario. For example, in 2015, the average size of the 
CHRT’s three final rulings ordering general damages was $30,000.147 The average size of the 20 awards 
issued by the B.C. Human Rights Tribunal in 2015 for injury to “dignity, feelings and self-respect” was 
$16,452, over $3,000 higher than the average award in Ontario in 2015.148 
 
In terms of the volume and quality of jurisprudence produced nationally on anti-discrimination law since 
2008, the work of the HRTO is unmatched. However, in our view the Tribunal’s record in assessing general 
damages does not live up to the promise of its impressive body of work on liability issues. Since the 
adoption of a comprehensive Code and the establishment of the Commission in 1961, both firsts of their 
kind in the country, Ontario “has long served as a model for other human rights systems in Canada”.149 Just 
as it has in protecting human rights in other ways in the past, we would like to see Ontario take the lead in 
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its approach to general damages awards. We hope that the analysis and recommendations in this paper 
might help point the way forward. 
 
 
